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ustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the U.S. Supreme 
Court believes that courts in the United States and 
other countries have much to learn from one another: 
“The U.S. judicial system will be the poorer ... if we do not 
both share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with 
values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own.”1
Justice Stephen Breyer frequently emphasizes the benefit of study-
ing the decisions and practices of other legal systems.2 Even their col-
league Antonin Scalia, who rejects the citation of foreign precedent 
in the course of interpreting the U.S. Constitution, nevertheless 
acknowledges that “you do not understand your own legal system 
– its distinctiveness, and what drives it – until you examine some 
other system.”3 
Though they sometimes take different positions on 
contested legal issues, these jurists agree that lawyers 
and judges can gain valuable information by 
comparing and contrasting the legal systems of 
different countries.
In this paper, we bring a comparative perspective 
to an important procedural issue faced in many judicial sys-
tems. We examine the exercise of the power of case selection 
in three supreme courts that have each been given some degree 
of control over whether to accept particular cases for review. 
Our focus will be two American courts, the Supreme Court of the 
United States (USSC) and the Supreme Court of Georgia (GASC), 
as well as one Russian court, the Supreme Arbitrazh (Commercial) 
Court of the Russian Federation (SACRF).
When a Supreme Court exercises the power to grant review in par-
ticular cases, its decisions raise profound questions about the court’s 
role in the larger legal system. Case selection forces judges to reflect 
on a court’s mission, its reason for existence.
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U.S. Supreme Court (USSC)
The current process for reviewing petitions for certiorari in the 
U.S. Supreme Court has been in place for many years. Much of the 
work of reviewing cert petitions occurs in the “cert pool,” in which all 
but one of the justices participate.6 Cert petitions are divided among 
the law clerks for the eight participating justices. The assigned clerk 
must review the petition, along with any response, conduct appropri-
ate research and prepare a short memorandum. 
This “cert memo” will typically summarize the issues presented 
and make a recommendation regarding whether the petition for 
certiorari should be granted. The cert memo will be circulated for 
review by the eight justices in the cert pool, any of whom might ask 
his or her own clerks to do additional research.
The only justice who does not participate in the cert pool is Justice 
John Paul Stevens, who prefers to review all petitions for certiorari 
in chambers. Stevens’ four clerks divide the cert petitions among 
themselves and prepare brief memoranda concerning petitions they 
wish to bring to Stevens’ attention. Review by Stevens and his clerks 
constitutes the principal institutional check on the cert pool review 
process.
Cert petitions that have been reviewed are scheduled for consider-
ation at a conference of the justices. Most petitions will not be indi-
vidually discussed by the court. To receive individual consideration, a 
justice must place the case on the court’s “discuss list.” 
The Supreme Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court of the Russian Federation.
Standards and procedures for review of lower court decisions
Supreme Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court of the Russian 
Federation (SACRF)
The Russian arbitrazh courts4 were established in 1991 as a 
separate branch of state courts dedicated to resolving commercial 
disputes. The SACRF occupies the highest level of the arbitrazh 
court system.
Potentially every arbitrazh case submitted to the SACRF might be 
reviewed by the Presidium.5 But the application must go through a 
preliminary filtering stage before being accepted for consideration. 
The application is distributed to the appropriate panel according 
to specialization and a judge is assigned. This judge takes primary 
responsibility for the case and will participate in proceedings before 
the Presidium if review is granted.
Within a month, the assigned judge and two other judges examine 
the application and related documents to determine whether the 
case presents grounds for review under article 304 of the Arbitrazh 
Procedural Code (APC). The three-judge panel will issue an opinion 
giving reasons for the decision to grant or deny review. An opinion 
granting review will be sent to the opposing party, together with 
the application and accompanying documents and a deadline for a 
response. The Presidium will review a case within three months after 
the panel decision granting review.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Georgia Supreme Court (GASC)
A centralized administrative staff assists the GASC in reviewing 
petitions for certiorari. Incoming petitions are assigned randomly to 
staff attorneys, who do not specialize with respect to subject matter. 
The staff attorney will first review the cert petition to ensure that 
formal requirements have been satisfied and will then prepare a 
memorandum summarizing the facts, the questions of law presented 
and other relevant information. 
The memo will typically include a recommendation as to whether 
the petition for certiorari should be granted. The memo will be dis-
tributed to all seven of the GASC’s justices.
In addition to the staff attorney, each cert petition will be assigned 
to one of the justices by wheel, meaning a particular justice receives 
every seventh petition. The assigned justice reviews the petition and 
presents the case at a conference of the court, making a recommenda-
tion that may depart from that of the staff attorney. The members of 
the court then discuss the case and take a vote. 
If the court unanimously agrees with the recommendation of the 
assigned justice, the petition is granted or denied without further 
discussion. If any justice does not agree with the recommendation, 
he or she can ask that the petition be deferred for a “second reading” 
by another member of the court. 
At that point, justices may circulate memoranda concerning the 
pending cert petition, which will be discussed and voted upon for the 
second time at a later conference. Grant of a petition for certiorari 
requires a majority vote of the court.7
The Georgia Constitution limits review of Georgia Court of 
Appeals decisions to cases “of gravity or great public importance.”8 
The GASC rules provide little elaboration: “A review on certiorari is 
not a right. A petition for the writ will be granted only in cases of 
great concern, gravity, or importance to the public.”9
The rule does clarify, however, that “certiorari generally will not be 
granted to review the sufficiency of evidence.”10
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Cases in which the cert pool memorandum recommends a grant of 
certiorari are typically placed on the discuss list, and any justice may 
add cases to the list. Certiorari will be automatically denied in cases 
not placed on the discuss list by the day before the conference. Grant 
of certiorari, which results in full briefing and oral argument, requires 
the votes of at least four of the nine justices.
Rule 10 of the USSC sets forth the standards for review of peti-
tions for certiorari. The rule provides that review by writ of certiorari 
“is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.” The court will 
only grant a petition for certiorari “for compelling reasons,” such as a 
conflict of authority on an important federal question. The rule indi-
cates that the court will “rarely” grant certiorari “when the asserted 
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a 
properly stated rule of law.” 
Justices of the Supreme Court of Georgia are: (back, l. to r.) Harris Hines, George Carley 
(LL.B.’62), Hugh Thompson, Harold Melton (J.D.’91), (front, l. to r.) Carol Hunstein 
(presiding justice), Leah Ward Sears (chief justice) and Robert Benham (J.D.’70). 
Common features 
A high level of selectivity
While procedures for case selection differ markedly in the three 
courts we studied, they all produced comparable outcomes in one 
respect: only a small percentage of proffered cases were accepted for 
review. 
The USSC reports that it received 7,496 case filings during its 
October 2004 term. It accepted 87 cases (disposing of 85 in signed 
opinions), indicating an acceptance rate of approximately 1.16 per-
cent.11 
Statistics published by the SACRF indicate that 16,172 petitions 
for review were considered in 2005 and review was granted in 379 
cases, generating an acceptance rate of 2.34 percent.12 
Statistics from the GASC indicate that the court granted 43 out 
of 527 petitions for certiorari in 2005, for an acceptance rate of 8.16 
percent.13
The relatively low case acceptance rate in these three supreme 
courts highlights the fact that case selection represents a sort of 
rationing process. Each court possesses only limited appellate 
resources that can be brought to bear on the review of lower courts’ 
decisions. Case selection therefore constitutes an exercise in seeking 
to ensure wise use of judicial resources.
Maintaining uniformity as a selection criterion
In both the USSC and the SACRF, the most commonly invoked 
reason for granting review is the necessity to restore uniformity 
in light of conflicting lower court decisions. It would probably be 
accurate to say that the goal of maintaining uniformity in the inter-
pretation of applicable law constitutes the principal rationale for 
structuring a court system so that cases are funneled to a single court 
of last resort.
A comparison of case selection practices
6 Fall	2006/Winter	2007Advocate
Case importance as a  
selection criterion
All three supreme 
courts give promi-
nent attention in 
the case selection 
process to the 
importance of 
cases presented for 
review. While a vari-
ety of meanings could 
be attached to terms like 
“importance” or “pub-
lic interest,” a core concept 
applicable in all three courts is 
that a case fitting these criteria must 
generally affect more people than just the parties in the 
particular litigation. A Supreme Court better fulfills its 
unique role in the legal system if it carefully chooses cases 
based upon their systemic impact, rather than the interests of 
individual parties.
Avoiding mere “error correction”
All three supreme courts recognize that limited appellate resources 
are best expended resolving appeals that will potentially affect many 
people in multiple cases, not just the parties before the court. As a 
corollary to this proposition, the American courts have concluded 
that they should generally avoid mere “error correction.” 
Even if the party filing a petition for certiorari makes a plausible 
showing that a lower court erred in a particular case, that will not jus-
tify intervention by the USSC or GASC unless correcting the error 
could affect the resolution of similar cases involving other parties.
The avoidance of mere error correction emphasizes the character 
of case selection as a rationing process. Of course, this principle 
tends to contradict a common popular understanding of the role of 
a Supreme Court. 
Lay people often see a Supreme Court as the final guarantor of 
justice, the backstop to ensure that all cases will be properly resolved 
according to law. We believe, however, that error correction should 
generally be viewed as the responsibility of the intermediate appellate 
courts, not a Supreme Court.
Variations in case selection processes
While the three courts were comparable in terms of the low per-
centage of cases accepted and the criteria applied in the selection 
process, they differed significantly with respect to the procedures 
employed.
Degree of judicial involvement
The process of case selection in the SACRF ensures a significant 
level of judicial involvement in every case. By contrast, under the 
screening process currently employed by the USSC, many requests 
for review will be resolved without any justice having read the peti-
tion for certiorari.
Comparison of the case selection procedures in these three courts 
raises the question whether the USSC should move in the direction 
of the other courts (and its own earlier practice) so that the justices 
would devote more personal attention to the review of cert peti-
tions.
In considering this issue, we return to the theme of wisely ration-
ing limited judicial resources. In the 1920s, when the justices indi-
vidually reviewed cert petitions, the court received fewer than 400 
petitions annually.14 That amounts to approximately 5 percent of the 
7,500-8,000 petitions filed in recent years. 
The large number of cert petitions per judge in the USSC neces-
sarily requires substantial reliance on staff assistance. Moreover, the 
justices must allocate time between reviewing petitions for certiorari 
and writing opinions in argued cases. Since the former responsibil-
ity is arguably less important than the latter, the USSC has made a 
defensible decision to manage the certiorari process in a manner that 
leaves more judicial time for the opinion writing task.
Discretion in the case selection process
The rules of the USSC explicitly affirm that the decision whether 
to grant a petition for certiorari constitutes a matter of judicial dis-
cretion. There is a clear distinction between an appeal as a matter of 
right and discretionary review by writ of certiorari. 
In the SACRF, by contrast, the decision to review a lower court 
judgment has been viewed as a legal decision. If the statutory stan-
dards for review are met, it has been thought that the court has a duty 
to take the case.
We believe discretion in case selection allows a Supreme Court to 
steward its resources and more efficiently fulfill its role in the overall 
legal system. When the USSC receives a petition for certiorari show-
ing an apparent conflict of authority among the lower courts, the 
court sometimes concludes that it would be wiser to deny certiorari 
and await further developments. 
In some cases, the court wants to learn the views of additional 
lower court judges on a difficult question before reaching its own 
conclusion. In other situations, the particular case may constitute a 
poor vehicle for resolving a conflict of authority, either because the 
facts are atypical or because there are arguable jurisdictional defects 
that could prevent the court from reaching the merits. 
Finally, denying certiorari can give lower courts time to resolve a 
conflict on their own without Supreme Court intervention. Such 
discretion could prove useful to the SACRF in efficiently supervising 
the system of arbitrazh courts. 
Explanation of decisions denying review
The SACRF issues written opinions when it declines to review 
cases from the lower courts. Opinions denying review contain vary-
ing degrees of explanation, depending on the particular judges writ-
ing the order. By contrast, the USSC and GASC generally do not 
explain decisions rejecting petitions for certiorari. 
Any serious effort to provide individualized orders explaining deni-
als of certiorari would require the USSC or GASC to make a much 
greater expenditure of judicial resources than that necessitated by cur-
rent screening processes. We do not think the potential advantages of 
explained denials merit such a large imposition on the justices’ time. 
First, in the USSC and GASC, petitions for certiorari concern 
access to a possible second layer of appellate consideration, one 
designed to be used only selectively. 
Second, if a Supreme Court exists primarily to maintain uniformi-
ty in the interpretation of law, failure to take any particular case can 
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create only a temporary systemic problem, easily corrected in time. 
Third, the advantages of additional information from published 
orders denying certiorari would likely be marginal, since the justices 
have often explained in written opinions why they granted certiorari 
in particular cases.
Expectations of the parties
The USSC clearly places the burden on the party seeking review to 
do the work of persuading the court to take the case. The less detailed 
SACRF requirements make it easier to file an application for review, 
but also leave more of the burden of determining whether there are 
grounds for review on the judges and 
their staff. 
Of course, a party seeking review 
obviously has an incentive to make a 
persuasive case, but additional guid-
ance on the court’s expectations could 
help both the parties and the judges.
The SACRF makes the decision 
whether to accept a case based upon 
the application of the party seeking 
review. The opposing party may not 
even know an application has been 
submitted until the case is handed 
over to the Presidium by the three-
judge screening panel. 
The practice in the USSC, by con-
trast, has been to call for a response 
from the opposing party before 
deciding whether to grant certiorari. 
Hearing from both parties would 
make the procedure more adversarial 
and help in the decision making pro-
cess. We therefore recommend that 
the SACRF adopt the practice of call-
ing for a response from the opposing 
party before deciding whether to refer 
a case to the Presidium for review on 
the merits.
Specialization among 
reviewers
In the SACRF, applications for 
review are considered by judges with 
expertise in particular areas of law. By 
virtue of their training and experience, 
the judges are well positioned to evalu-
ate the effect of a particular lower court decision on the relevant body 
of law, hence the value of referring the case to the Presidium. 
One perennial criticism of the case selection process in the USSC 
has been that petitions for certiorari are reviewed by clerks with mini-
mal legal experience. Without broad experience, they may be prone 
to underestimate the practical import of an issue raised in a petition 
for certiorari or the extent to which it departs from other decisions 
in the field. 
Drawing on the experience of the SACRF, we think the USSC, 
and perhaps the GASC as well, might profitably consider bringing 
greater specialization to bear on the review of petitions for certiorari. 
In the USSC, this could be done by increasing the role of permanent 
staff in the review of cert petitions. Memos from permanent staff 
with relevant expertise could sometimes supplement the work of 
clerks in the cert pool.
The GASC already uses permanent staff to screen petitions for 
certiorari. Introducing greater specialization might be a relatively 
simple matter, requiring minimal changes to the review process. Each 
staff attorney could take responsibility for reviewing cert petitions 
dealing with particular areas of the law and could be expected to 
develop greater expertise over time. 
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